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Carbon markets are central to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
This paper introduces a new carbon market model that aims to simulate the 
development of the global carbon market over the next 10-20 years. The model is 
based on detailed regional and sectoral marginal abatement cost data and takes an 
“investor perspective”. That is, it takes into account market distortions like taxes and 
accounts for imperfections in policy delivery. We estimate that implementing all the 
carbon market proposals that are currently contemplated would result in global 
emission reductions of 7 GtCO2 by 2020 – substantial, but well short of the 
mitigation effort required for a 450ppm CO2e pathway. The global carbon price 
would vary from €30 per tCO2 in Europe to €15 per tCO2 on the international offset 
market and in the new US emissions trading scheme currently under discussion. 
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The Carbon Market in 2020 





Carbon trading has emerged as one the key policy instruments in the fight against 
climate change. Economists have long argued that putting a price on carbon is an 
essential and effective way to curtail greenhouse gas emissions.1 In theory, this can be 
achieved either through a tax on carbon emissions or a cap-and-trade scheme, where a 
restricted number of emission allowances is traded on dedicated markets. The relative 
merits of the two approaches is still debated in the literature,2 but in practice policy 
makers have overwhelmingly opted for cap-and-trade.3 They are swayed by the 
political economy advantages of carbon trading, for which political support is much 
easier to build (Hepburn 2006, 2007). 
 
In 2008 the global carbon market was worth $126 billion – twice as much as in 2007 
and four times as much as in 2006 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009). Thanks to growing 
trading volumes (which offset depressed prices) 2009 promises to be another record 
year. The biggest market by far is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), 
which accounts for over 70% of activity. The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), the world’s biggest baseline-and-credit (or offset) market, accounts for 
around 25%, most of it secondary market transactions. Smaller schemes like Joint 
Implementation, international emissions (or AAU) trading or the voluntary carbon 
market and regional systems, for example, in New England and New South Wales, 
contribute the rest.   
 
These schemes could all be dwarfed by a new federal US cap and trade scheme that is 
currently being debated by Congress and which observers expect could be up and 
running within five years. Carbon trading is also being deliberated in Australia, New 
                                                 
1
 See for example Fisher et al. (1996) for an early articulation, and subsequently Stern (2006), among 
others. 
2
 See Hoel and Karp (2001), Hepburn (2006) and Newell and Pizer (2003). The classic reference is 
Weitzman (1974). 
3
 A prominent supporter of taxation is Nordhaus (2005). 
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Zealand and – to a lesser extent – Canada, Japan and Mexico, among others. 
Meanwhile, the negotiations on the international climate change regime post-2012 
may well result in an extended scope for global carbon trading, for example through 
an enhanced CDM and new trading instruments for forest-based carbon or 
international transport emissions. 
 
This paper asks how the international carbon market may develop over the next ten 
years if these systems are put in place as currently contemplated. The analysis is 
based on a new carbon market model, which extends and draws on previous work by 
McKinsey (2009) on the cost of greenhouse gas mitigation.4 The model uses 
differences in marginal abatement costs between countries and sectors to calculate 
potential trading volumes, gains from trade and the equilibrium price of carbon in 
different market segments. 
 
Using marginal abatement cost estimates to simulate arbitrage opportunities is a fairly 
common piece of analysis. Most regionally disaggregated energy-economy models 
and integrated assessment models function in that vein, using either top-down 
(production function-based) or bottom-up (engineering-based) cost information.5   
 
An important feature of our model versus other (particularly top down) energy models 
is the granularity of the abatement data, which is modeled by lever/technology, by 
industry and by region. Detailed and consistent cost information allows us to model 
individual policy proposals at much higher resolution than other models and isolate 
the consequences of detailed policy choices, such as constraints on the use of forestry 
offsets or regulatory policies to force renewable energy uptake (two prominent 
features of the EU’s climate change and energy package).  
 
Further real-world flavor is added by incorporating policy distortions (such as most 
taxes and subsidies), firm-level constraints (such as high costs of capital) and limits to 
the uptake of some abatement options (for example due to insufficient or poorly 
                                                 
4
 Other sources of  “bottom up” marginal abatement cost data include for example AIM (Kainuma et al. 
2007), GAINS (Amann et al. 2009b), IMAGE (Bouwman et al. 2006) and POLES (European 
Commission 1996, Russ et al. 2009). See also Amann et al. (2009a). 
5
 See for example the results of the EMF-22 model comparison (Clarke et al. 2009) and the IPCC 
mitigation cost discussion (Barker et al. 2007a). For a critical assessment of the use of MACs see 
Morris et al. (2008). 
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executed policies). In other words, our analysis takes an investor perspective, rather 
than the social planning perspective typical of economic models. We are less 
interested in the theoretical economic potential of carbon trading than in the actual 
financial flows, trade volumes and carbon prices that may materialize in the real 
world. 
 
We start our discussion, in the next section, with a brief description of the carbon 
market model on which the analysis is based. Section 3 then looks at likely carbon 
market developments up to 2020, based on the implementation of the policy proposals 
on the table in summer 2009. These proposals are still in flux and bound to evolve. 
Section 4 therefore highlights the sensitivity of market developments to some 
pertinent policy choices, in particular the overall level of ambition and the degree of 
trading flexibility over space (through linking) and time (through banking / 
borrowing).  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Modeling the carbon market 
 
Trade in carbon emissions is driven by differences in abatement costs. The larger the 
differences in costs, the larger the scope for trading and the bigger the gains from 
trade. At the core of our carbon market model are the detailed marginal abatement 
cost data gathered by McKinsey and summarized in version 2 of its global cost curves 
(McKinsey 2009).  
 
McKinsey’s cost curve model is a bottom up, microeconomic model that assesses the 
technically available abatement potential versus a business-as-usual (BAU) reference 
case solution. It does so at a granular level – covering approximately 200 
technologies, in 13 sectors, and 21 regions. The G8+5 nations are covered 
individually, with a further 8 regional assessments ensuring global coverage. 
 
The carbon markets model splits the original cost data further into different carbon 
market segments: international emissions trading among governments (the AAU 
market), domestic cap-and-trade markets in Annex 1 countries (including the EU 
ETS, and the new US trading system) and the international offset market (a reformed 
and expanded CDM, say). Separate cost curves were derived for “traded sectors” that 
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are expected to be covered by the various carbon markets and non-traded sectors that 
are likely to remain outside.  The analysis also accounts for regulatory policies that 
mandate particular abatement options, such as energy efficiency standards in 
buildings and renewable energy targets. 
 
The original McKinsey cost curves are estimates of the economic potential for cost-
effective GHG mitigation.  For the current purpose, this economic perspective was 
replaced by an investor perspective.  This required two adjustments. 
 
First, economic costs were translated into financial costs by introducing existing 
policy interventions like fuel taxes and energy subsidies (such as feed-in tariffs).  
Financing constraints were introduced by replacing the social discount rate of the 
original cost curves (4 % real) with a higher, differentiated rate (on average 11%) that 
reflects firms’ actual costs of capital – varying by industry and geography.6  
 
The net effect of these corrections typically is to make the cost curves steeper. Energy 
efficiency measures with negative costs tend to become even more attractive if energy 
is subject to tax,7 while the higher cost of capital increases the cost of capital-
intensive investments like renewables. There are also some changes in the merit order, 
as measures with particularly high upfront costs become more expensive and move 
further up the cost curve.  
 
The second adjustment acknowledges limits in policy effectiveness. Rather than 
assuming the full implementation of all cost-effective mitigation options, as the 
original cost curve implicitly does, our analysis recognizes that the uptake will be less 
than perfect as a result of insufficient policy ambition, ineffective policies and poor 
execution. This is similar to the approach taken by the UK Committee on Climate 
Change, which also distinguishes between technical / economic potential and actual 
uptake, which is a function of the policy environment (CCC 2008).8 
 
                                                 
6
 Discounting is one of the most controversial issues in climate change economics. A good synthesis is 
Dasgupta (2008). 
7
 The inverse happens in countries with energy subsidies, still a frequent occurrence in many parts of 
the world. 
8
 Of course, policy makers anticipating an imperfect uptake of policies may ramp up their measures to 
counterbalance that effect. 
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To do so we made an assessment of the current policy proposals in each of the 21 
regions and 13 sectors of the model. Each of those proposals was rewarded a policy 
ambition score, which scaled the abatement potential (see Chart 1). These policy 
ambition scores are based on a literature study of the effectiveness of climate change 
policy. Further, each country was awarded a policy execution score, which is based on 
McKinsey staff assessments informed by a range of governance indicators.9 The 
technical abatement potential was then multiplied with the two factors in order to 
derive an assessment of the achievable abatement, given expected government policy 
effectiveness. Note that this does not include the expected outcome of the carbon 
market, which effectively provides the financing for the positive cost measures.  
 
The result of this adjustment was to reduce the uptake of cost effective measures to 24 
GtCO2 in 2030, compared with a technical potential of 38 GtCO2 in the original 
analysis (see Chart 2). Alternative assumptions on policy effectiveness will be 
introduced in section 4. 
 
The model is solved over four steps (see Chart 3). The first step is to balance supply 
and demand in the international offset market. Second, the regional cap-and-trade 
systems are balanced using the market-clearing offset price calculated in step one.  
Third, the AAU price is set equal to the offset price. These steps allow us to calculate 
the prices in each of the markets, the amount of (domestic) abatement achieved as 
well as the trading with other markets (typically import of international offsets). 
 
In the fourth step banking and borrowing is introduced, assuming a five-year time 
horizon for companies under a cap. That is, companies are assumed to bank (borrow) 
allowances, if the expected price five years later is much higher (lower) than in the 
current year.  
 
Since banking and borrowing of allowances can increase or reduce the offset demand 
in the given year, an iterative algorithm is used. Linkage of carbon markets (beyond 
the international offset market) is possible, but not set in the default model. 
 
                                                 
9
 UNDP (2004) provides a useful survey of available governance indicators. 
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The international offset market is the key market mechanism in the model, balancing 
global supply and demand across markets. The offset supply curve depends on sectors 
and regions participating in the offset market, policy effectiveness, and rules 
governing eligible offsets (for example, NPV-positive levers may be excluded as non-
additional).10  
 
For each of the regional cap-and-trade systems, the demand for international offsets is 
dependent on the offset price assuming that companies will always choose the 
cheapest option between regular allowances, abatement under the cap-and-trade 
system, domestic offsets, international offsets and, where applicable, strategic reserve 
allowances. The offset demand on a country level (as opposed to the cap-and-trade 
system) is assumed to be inelastic and is calculated as the gap between a country’s 
reduction target and the abatement achieved through domestic actions (both inside 
and outside a cap-and-trade system) after perfect AAU trading.11 
 
3. The carbon market in 2020 
 
The first application of the model was to analyze carbon market developments under a 
“Follow me” scenario, that is, the expectation that the low range of all currently 
announced or proposed policies will be implemented. More specifically, we 
considered carbon market policies as contemplated in summer 2009 (see Table 1 for 
details). The scenario was derived from a range of policy documents, including the 
December 2008 climate change and energy package of the EU and the Waxman-
Markey bill (version passed by the House of Representatives) in the US.  
 
The scenario foresees the establishment or expansion of national cap -and-trade 
schemes in Europe (EU and neighboring states like Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland), the US, Australia and Canada. It foresees an expanded global baseline-
and-credit (or offset) market modeled on a reformed CDM and the continuation of 
international emissions (or AAU) trading between Annex I governments. The various 
cap-and-trade markets are not linked, although they are all connected to the global 
                                                 
10
 See IETA (2008), Michaelowa and Pallav (2007), Michaelowa and Umamaheswaran (2006), Streck 
and Lin (2008) and Wara (2007) for a discussion of CDM additionality and CDM performance.  
11
 We ignore the effect of penalties for non-performance. 
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offset market and AAU trading, which creates an indirect link. Importantly, we 
assume that avoided deforestation (so called REDD) offsets are only eligible and 
available to a limited extent.  
 
The main results are summarized in Chart 4. In the AAU market, the Annex-I cap-
and-trade caps total an estimated 16.7 GtCO2 in 2020 and 12.6 GtCO2 in 2030. Of 
the abatement required to meet these targets in the developed world, about two thirds 
will be realized domestically, with the remainder through offsets. Offsets are the 
price-setting (i.e., marginal) supplier of abatement to developed world, suggesting that 
AAU prices will be equal to offset prices. 
 
The EU ETS has 1.7 GtCO2 of emission allowances in 2020 and potentially 1.4 
GtCO2 in 2030. The majority of the required abatement to meet these targets is 
realized domestically, as the offset quotas are tight (about 1.6 GtCO2 over 2008-12). 
The tight targets and offset quotas means the EU ETS has the highest prices of all 
carbon markets, peaking at €40 per tCO2 in 2025. The price-setting abatement 
capacity is domestic. Banking of offsets can reduce the risk of price drops, but unlike 
the US ETS there are no other stabilization mechanisms in place. 
 
The US ETS (as proposed in the Waxman-Markey bill) is assumed to be operational 
as of 2012. The market has 5.1 GtCO2 of emission allowances in 2020 and 3.5 
GtCO2 in 2030. Initially most abatement is realized through domestic and 
international offsets (1 GtCO2 out of 1.4 GtCO2 in 2015), but over time domestic 
abatement starts to play a larger role (2.5 GtCO2 out of 4.1 GtCO2 in 2030). The US 
ETS market price will be set by offsets, even after taking into account the 4:5 discount 
rate that is currently contemplated. 
 
The offset market is assumed to continue in the future, with avoided deforestation 
offsets remaining limited to 20-40% of global offset supply. Demand for offsets 
comes mainly from the US ETS and AAU countries. 
 
Overall, carbon trading is estimated to trigger incremental investments of almost €800 
billion between 2016 and 2020, much of it in electric power and transport, and over 
three quarters of it in China, the US and the EU. 
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Chart 5 displays price developments. It shows a substantial price differential between 
the EU ETS, where the allowance price could rise above €35 in 2025, and the 
international offset and US allowance prices, which we expect to increase to €23 by 
2030.  In Europe, where the use of offsets is constrained, the carbon price is 
determined by the marginal cost of domestic abatement, assumed to be various 
renewable energy technologies (for example, wind alongside fuel switching in 2015, 
solar alongside small hydro in 2020). In the US, which currently foresees a more 
liberal use of international offsets, the allowance price is expected to follow the 
(discounted) offset price, since offset purchases are the preferred abatement activity at 
the margin.12  
 
It is important to note that in both markets, a large share of the abatement will be 
covered and achieved through mandated policies like the EU’s Renewable Energy 
Directive. Chart 6 shows this in more detail for the case of the EU ETS. The chart 
shows the EU marginal abatement cost curve, reordered to give priority to mandated 
actions and to factor in the contribution of offsets. The chart also shows how the 
prevalence of cheap abatement opportunities encourages banking. We will come back 
to this issue in section 4. 
 
The offset price, in the meantime, is kept low by a steady flow of low cost emission 
reductions in sectors like electric power, industry, forestry and waste (two thirds of it 
from China). In fact offset prices could remain almost constant over time as the 
growth in offset supply is in line with growing demand (see Chart 5 above). But even 
at this relatively low price offset trading is a financially attractive activity, creating 
substantial trade flows and yielding substantial benefits. Chart 7 shows the net trade 
flows in the offset market and the gains from trade. 
 
4. The impact of different policy designs 
 
Although currently announced initiatives provide a good indication of how policy 
might develop, the debate is clearly still in flux and much will change as options are 
                                                 
12
 See Goettle and Fawcett (2009) for a detailed analysis of cap and trade impacts in the US. 
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reviewed and political consensus is built. The academic debate on the merit of 
different design mechanisms is also ongoing and will influence policy choices (see for 
example Fankhauser and Hepburn 2009). In this section, we ask how different policy 
choices would affect the price and volume dynamics in the carbon market. In 
particular, we look at four design options: (i) a change in policy effectiveness and 
abatement ambition (ii) the linking of regional markets and (iii) changes to the rules 
on banking and borrowing.  
 
4.1 Different levels of ambition 
 
The policies currently announced, which form the backbone of section 3, would result 
in global emission reductions of 7 GtCO2 in 2020 and 15 GtCO2 in 2030. This is well 
short of the 25-40% reduction in global emissions that the IPCC called for in its 
fourth assessment report (Barker et al. 2007b) and the 17 GtCO2 of reductions that 
Project Catalyst (2009) estimates will be needed by 2020 to stabilize concentrations at 
around 450ppm CO2e, and thus have a fighting chance of limiting global warming to 
2oC. However, even the low targets used in the "Follow me" scenario are not ratified 
yet. 
 
We also looked at two other carbon market scenarios reflecting different degrees of 
ambition. The first scenario, labeled a “High ambition”, includes a stricter, 20% 
reduction target, relative to 1990,  – with correspondingly tighter domestic caps and 
offset limits – and increased policy effectiveness: 100% of technical potential 
mandated in Annex I countries in non-market sectors and increased ambitions in the 
developing world.  
 
The second alternative is a pessimistic “Head in the sand” scenario, where only 
policies that are already into effect (for example the EU ETS) are included. Crucially, 
this excludes federal carbon trading in the US. The two scenarios are detailed in Table 
2. 
 
Chart 8 shows difference in carbon prices for the two scenarios, and Chart 9 displays 
the impact on global emissions reductions. Higher levels of ambition have a strong 
impact on carbon prices, in part offset by improved policy effectiveness, which 
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increases supply. In the "Head in the sand" scenario, offset prices could fall to around 
€5 per tCO2 by 2020 without the US joining the global carbon markets. 
 
In contrast, the effect of more ambitious scenarios on overall emission reductions is 
relatively limited (Chart 9). Under a “High ambition” scenario only about 60% of the 
theoretical potential is taken up. This is mainly due to the fact that emissions will 
continue to grow strongly in countries that are currently at a low level of 
development, including India. To change that and move closer to the 450ppm 
pathway, much more comprehensive targets that cover most countries would be 
required, as well as more aggressive policies on sectors like forestry and agriculture 
that are not covered by the carbon market. 
 
4.2 Linking of markets 
 
Key design question is to what extent regional markets will be linked up. This 
particularly concerns the link between the world’s two biggest carbon markets in the 
US and the EU. In our main results, we assumed that the two markets would be linked 
only indirectly through the international offset market, on which they both draw.  
 
It is instructive to explore what would happen if the two markets were more closely 
integrated, at the extreme through the unrestricted exchange of allowances between 
the two jurisdictions. It is an aspiration among many European policy makers to 
achieve such a link as early as 2015 (Lazerowicz 2009).  
 
The enthusiasm for linking is understandable. Conceptually, flexibility in space is key 
to keeping down compliance costs. In practice, a number of preconditions will have to 
be met before such a link becomes realistic (Fankhauser and Hepburn 2009). Chief 
among them are consistent levels of ambition between the two policy spheres. 
Linking a system that is designed to be high price with a low-price scheme would 
create policy tensions as trading will inevitably equate prices across systems. In 
addition there is a need for coordination on regulatory arrangements, including the use 
of, and quality standards for, offsets. 
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A linked market would result in prices very close to the prices in an autarkic US 
market (chart 10). This can be explained by the much smaller size of the EU ETS 
compared to the US system and the generous US offset limit that is not exhausted in 
the autarky case. 
 
4.3 Banking and borrowing 
 
Banking and borrowing (or flexibility over time, in the terminology of Fankhauser 
and Hepburn 2009) is similarly important. Complete flexibility to allocate abatement 
effort over time would allow firms to smooth short-term fluctuations (for example, 
related to fuel prices) and coordinate emission reductions with the investment cycle 
and the replacement of the capital stock.   
 
For example, the summer 2009 drop in the EU allowance price would have been 
much sharper if it had not been possible to bank surplus emissions into the post-2012 
period. Conversely, the price collapse in the first phase of the EU ETS would have 
been avoided if surplus emissions could have been banked into the second trading 
period. In fact, self-contained trading periods without banking or borrowing lead, by 
design, to price spikes or troughs at the end of that period unless installations are able 
to plan their emissions to perfection. 
 
Despite its conceptual advantages, most systems constrain intertemporal flexibility. 
Banking from one commitment period to the next is generally allowed, but there tend 
to be limits to the amount of borrowing that is permitted, both between commitment 
periods and within individual periods. This is due to a (political) preference for timely 
abatement, but also concerns about time inconsistency – that is, the possibility that 
delayed commitments may not be honoured in full (Fankhauser and Hepburn 2009).  
 
The simulation results show how banking and borrowing can soften price fluctuations. 
The effect is particularly strong in the EU ETS, where tight targets and limited offset 
quotas may lead to a price spike in 2025 in the absence of intertemporal flexibility. 
Borrowing between trading phases is not allowed in the EU ETS, but banking alone is 
capable of reducing the spike from €65 per tCO2 to €38 per tCO2 (Chart 11). 
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The US ETS, as currently envisaged, would allow borrowing one year ahead for free 
and from subsequent years at an 8% interest rate. This is anticipated to have minimal 




The global carbon market could grow spectacularly over the next ten years. If current 
proposals are implemented – and this crucially includes a Waxman-Markey-style 
federal trading scheme in the US – the market volumes might reach $800 billion by 
2020, compared with $126 billion in 2008.  
 
In our main scenario, which is based on ‘current proposals’, we see the EU ETS 
prices rise from €13 in 2015 to €38 in 2025 before falling back to about €30. The high 
price is driven primarily by limited offset quotas. In the US, where offset quotas are 
more generous, prices stay much closer to the offset market price – rising from €13 in 
2015 to €23 in 2030. 
 
However, ‘current proposals’ result in an abatement outcome of just 7 GtCO2, 
bringing emissions down from a business-as-usual level of 61 GtCO2 in 2020 to 54 
GtCO2. This compares to 17 GtCO2 that might be needed by 2020 to stabilize 
concentrations at 450ppm, according to Project Catalyst (2009), and underscores the 
fact that the unilateral commitments in both developed and developing countries 
remain insufficient. Even in our most aggressive "High ambition" scenario, only 
about 60% of the theoretical emission reduction potential is taken up. To change that, 
much more comprehensive targets would be required that cover most countries, as 
well as more aggressive policies on forestry and agriculture. 
 
The shortfall in all our scenarios also underscores that carbon markets, while central 
to the global mitigation effort, are on their own not enough. The carbon market will 
only provide about 40% of the total abatement effort. Carbon trading has to be 
complemented by additional policy instruments to address non carbon price-related 
externalities. They may include standards (for example, renewable electricity 
standards, building codes and fuel efficiency standards), targeted revenue support 
(such as feed-in tariffs) and technology support in the form of subsidies for R&D and 
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pilot programs. Moreover, additional public finance will be needed to provide a 
strong, additional impetus for abatement in developing countries, particularly those 
currently not covered by the carbon market. 
 
Much will depend on how carbon markets are designed – how comprehensive they 
are, how ambitious, how well they are regulated and so on. This will determine to a 
large extent how much abatement we can achieve and at what overall cost.  
Particularly pertinent will be links to other markets, including the amount of offsets 
allowed and direct linking with other developed country schemes. The banking and 
borrowing mechanisms will determine the inter-temporal price development, and 
could influence price strongly as abatement will become cheaper over time when the 
abatement potential increases. 
 
The model we used to derive these conclusions is relatively simple in terms of its 
economic structure, but very rich in terms of the country and sector level mitigation 
strategies it details. These data were taken from the McKinsey cost curves, which 
provide comprehensive, internally consistent cost data for a wide array of countries 
and sectors. Cost data are of necessity uncertain, but even accepting these 
uncertainties it is clear that there is substantial scope for efficiency gains from carbon 
trade. Carbon markets can make an important and effective contribution to the global 
transition to a low carbon economy. 
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Table 1: Assumptions for ‘Follow me’ scenario
2020 reduction targets
▪ EU: 20% (of 1990)
▪ US: 20% (2005)
▪ Canada: 20% (2006)
▪ Japan: 15% (2005)
▪ Russia: 10% (1990)
▪ Ukraine: 20% (1990)
▪ Australia: 5% (2000)
▪ NZ: 25% (1990)
▪ South Korea1: 108% 
(2005)
▪ Annex I: 10% (1990)
2050 reduction targets
▪ EU: 80% (of 1990)
▪ US: 83% (2005)
▪ Canada: 60% (2006)
▪ Japan: 60% (2005)
▪ Russia: 60% (1990)
▪ Ukraine: 50% (1990)
▪ Australia: 60% (2000)
▪ NZ: 50% (1990)
▪ Annex I: 70% (1990)
AAU
EU ETS
▪ 2.02 Gt emissions in 2005
▪ Targets: 1.72 Gt in 2020 and 1.36 Gt in 2030
▪ Sector scope: power, cement, steel, petroleum, other 
industry
▪ Offset limits: 0.12 Gt in 2015 and 2020, no offsets 
thereafter. 0.6 Gt offsets banked in 2008 - 2012
▪ Banking allowed (5 year business foresight)
US ETS (Waxman Markey)
▪ 6.09 Gt emissions in 2005
▪ Targets: 5.06 Gt in 2020 and 3.53 Gt in 2030
▪ Sector scope: power, industry, transport, buildings
▪ Domestic offsets: 0.3 – 0.7 Gt p.a. in 2015 - 2030
▪ Int’l offset limits: 1.5 Gt in 2015 and 2020, 1.4 Gt in 2025, 
1.3 Gt in 20302 (discount of 80% as of 2017)
▪ Banking and borrowing allowed (5 year business foresight)
▪ Minimum price of $10/t in 2012 rising by real 5% annually
Australian and Canadian ETS
▪ 75% of country emissions in scope for Australia, scope as 
in US for Canada
▪ Targets in line with country targets







▪ Limited avoided 
deforestation3
Rules
▪ No NPV positive projects 
allowed in general
▪ Mandatory projects 
eligible (L- rule)
▪ NPV positive power levers 
affected by feed-in tariffs 
allowed (E- rule)
Offsets
1 Targets growing with BAU CAGR after 2020
2 Domestic and international offsets together must not exceed 2 G




















Table 2: Assumptions for other scenarios based on ‘Follow me’
AAU ETS Policy 
▪ Only binding targets 
for EU
▪ Only EU ETS
▪ Offset limit 0.06 Gt in 2025 
and 2030 (half of 2015 and 
2020 limit)
▪ Mandates in non-EU 
developed countries at 25% 
of ‘Follow me’
▪ No mandates in non-Annex I
▪ Market-driven policy score 
at 50% of ‘Follow me’ for 
non-EU developed countries 
and at 25% for non-Annex I




▪ Targets for ETS systems 
adjusted according to country 
targets
▪ Additional ETS in Japan and 
South Korea
▪ Offset limits increased by 
100% of additional reduction 
in 2015 and 2020 and 50% in 
2025 and 2030 in EU ETS
▪ 100% mandates in 
transport, buildings, 
agriculture, forestry and 
waste in Annex I
▪ 50% mandates for global air 
and sea transport
▪ Mandated policy score 
doubled (maximum of 
100%) in non-Annex I
▪ Market-driven scores at 
100% for Annex I and 50% 
for non-Annex I
▪ EU 30% and US 
20% reduction 
compared to 1990 
in 2020
▪ Reduction target on 
average 20% of 
1990 in 2020 and 
75% in 2050 in 
Annex I
▪ No hot air
 





















Chart 1: Market-driven policy effectiveness scores in ‘Follow me’ scenario
Groupings
Power








































































































































Canada OECD China Fiscally strong emerging India and other developing
Forestry 
U.S., Canada, OECD and 
Fiscally strong






Forestry is grouped differently to reflect importance of 
Brazil, Indonesia and Rest of Africa







100 * 90 = 90
90 * 90 = 81
25 * 80 = 20
90 * 100 = 90
35 * 90 = 32
100 * 100 = 100
85 * 90 = 77
67 * 90 = 60
60 * 80 = 48
90 * 100 = 90
45 * 90 = 41
77 * 80 = 61
30 * 60 = 18
47 * 60 = 28
40 * 60 = 24
72 * 80 = 58
100 * 60 = 60
100 * 100 = 10073 7  = 5
25 * 50 = 13
40 * 50 = 20
30 * 50 = 15
73 * 70 = 51
100 * 70 = 70
30 * 60 = 18
50 * 80 = 40
80 * 90 = 72
63 * 70 = 44
40 * 70 = 28
50 * 60 = 30
74 * 90 = 67
100 * 80 = 80





































Chart 2: Abatement cost curve after investor perspective 
adjustments
Abatement cost 2030, € per tCO2e
 





































▪ Reduce ETS abatement target while calculating ETS offset 
demand in case of borrowing
▪ Increase abatement target in case of banking
▪ Start values: No banking and borrowing














▪ Increase non-ETS offset demand in case of ETS borrowing
▪ Decrease non-ETS offset demand in case of ETS banking























• BAU: 20.6 Gt
• Emission permits 16.7 Gt
• Price: 13 EUR/t
EU ETS
• BAU: 2.3 Gt
• Permits: 1.7 Gt
• Price: 29 EUR/t
• 42 Mt banked
Offsets
• Total demand: 1.9 Gt
• Price: 13 EUR/t
US ETS
• BAU: 7.2 Gt
• Permits: 5.1 Gt
• Price: 16 EUR/t




(0.9 Gt after 
discount)
0.5 Gt import
(in excess of 
ETS import)




Developed countries Developing 
countries 
Other ETS1
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Chart 6: EU ETS cost curve 2020



















































Rest of non-Annex I 12.1
China 10.2









Capital flows Cost of abatement1 Total revenue / cost
+ =
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Chart 10: Carbon prices before and after linkage
€ per tCO2e, Follow me Scenario
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€ per tCO2e, Follow me Scenario
 
